

## Thinking in Christ

‘But who still bothers about theologians – except other theologians?’ Thus Nietzsche, writing in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> I have been charged with the responsibility of saying something about epistemology. Epistemology is a world of its own; although it is a branch of philosophy, there are entities known as ‘epistemologists’, whose dark trade includes such merchandise as internalism, externalism, reliabilism, coherentism, basicity, foundationalism and evidentialism. The *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, whose opening chapter is on epistemology, lists twenty-nine questions at the end, such as: ‘How important is it to have a definition of knowledge?’ ‘If a proposition is false, can one be justified in believing it?’ ‘If there is no certainty, can there be knowledge?’ ‘What role does scepticism play in philosophy?’ ‘Could you be dreaming now?’<sup>2</sup> I think that I may safely assume that such questions are not meant to be my quarry.

An alternative is to focus on questions of specifically religious epistemology, including the perennial question of faith and reason. Such is the public perception of ‘faith’ perspectives as opposed to ‘rational’ perspectives that this is potentially worth pursuing. But the question to which you want me to attend centres on whether there is a Christian ‘knowing’ applicable to the diverse range of academic disciplines. I have not been sure how best to approach this. When one begins thinking of zoology, music, French literature, psychology, cultural anthropology and so on, two difficulties come to mind. On the one hand, how is it possible to avoid being excessively general in treating ‘knowledge’? On the other, although one might, at least in principle, try to adumbrate a very tight, rigorous Christian ‘philosophy of knowing’, it would be a controversial enterprise at best and time (whose constraints would make the exercise impossible in

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<sup>1</sup> F.Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, tr. R.J.Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 1.28.

<sup>2</sup> N.Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James, *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 61-2. There is also a specific *Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*, most recently edited by J.Dancy, E.Sosa & M.Steup (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

practice, even if some judge it possible in principle) would be spent on purely internal philosophical discussion, examining the internal logic of a proposed scheme of ‘Christian philosophy’, rather than on potential application to different fields.

What a theologian with an eye on epistemology might attempt to offer a conference such as this is (a) a basis for believing in the necessity of approaching academic disciplines from a Christian point of view, (b) a *broad* orientation to the task and (c) remarks on particular issues in particular disciplines. As the day progresses, perhaps it will be possible to attend to (c). Only brief attention will be given to (a). So I shall concentrate on (b) as time allows.<sup>3</sup>

### ***Faithfulness and distinctiveness***

‘If we live by the Spirit’, Paul tells the Galatians, ‘let us also walk by the Spirit’ (5:25, RSV). Had he been top of the invitation list to address this conference, he might have adapted his words: ‘If we live in Christ, let us also think in Christ’. We are taking the time today to study his exhortation - actually an imperative - because we acknowledge that we are prone to think in terms inconsistent with our life in Christ, not on account of that universal inconsistency of practice which continually dogs our Christian profession, but on account of unconscious capitulation to surrounding modes of thought which we have failed to identify as alien to our Christian commitment. What does it mean to rectify this and think in Christ?

Training our attention on epistemology, it may appear natural to approach our question by asking: ‘How should we think *distinctively* as Christians?’ But that should not be the first theological question on the slate. The first question is surely: ‘How should we think *faithfully* as Christians?’ The effect of faithful thought may be distinctive thought; indeed, as we proceed with our thinking, we may find faithfulness and distinctiveness indistinguishable. However, it is subtly mistaken either to make distinction the first mark

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<sup>3</sup> My thanks to Andrew Basden for suggesting that I re-focus an earlier draft of this paper in a way that might be more helpful to participants. For any resulting inadequacy, I am entirely responsible.

of Christian thought or to seize on it with excessive theological zeal as the immediate implication of faithfulness. The thinking disciple operates within a community that is distinct (the church) and, in that respect, our very question about faithfulness presupposes our distinctiveness. But we intellectually position ourselves in relation to our Lord and master, and navigate the intellectual waters of life by that star which is Jesus Christ. Glancing about us horizontally at other craft, we may notice the radical distinctiveness of our course. Indeed, we may use horizontal survey to correct our course, for if we are plotting the same trajectory as most everybody else, we may justly suspect navigational error. Nonetheless, the principle obtains: we take our bearings from Jesus Christ and from him alone and only subsequently do we enquire how this is related to other trajectories.

To begin like this is not, I think, to expose ourselves unduly to the twin dangers of oversimplification and of relative abstraction. In order to put land-lubber flesh on these nautical considerations, let me wheel in what might look like a rival position, associated with Abraham Kuyper. I do not know the extent of familiarity with Kuyper in this group. Personally, I think that he is one of the most outstandingly important Christian thinkers in modern times – founder of the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880; Prime Minister of the Netherlands, 1901-05; church leader, political leader, journalist, indefatigable polemicist, launching things left, right and centre (no political reference there) in Dutch history, rather like the man who jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions at once. Kuyper (1837-1920) operated on the basis of a set of robust theological principles rooted in the Reformed tradition. I shall not attempt a balanced, still less a comprehensive, account of his thought on the matter in hand, not only because of constraints on our time but because I do not read Dutch and have to rely on translation and secondary sources. But I shall introduce pertinent remarks that he makes in the most familiar of his works.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> What follows draws on Kuyper's *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1899) but Kuyper's *Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931) provides the best known statement of his general position, whether or not its emphasis on the matter in hand is the same as we find in the *Encyclopedia*.

Kuyper maintained that the principle of regeneration confers upon the Christian a peculiar and corresponding principle of thought. ‘Regeneration breaks humanity in two, and repeals the unity of human consciousness’.<sup>5</sup> I leave aside here his application of this principle to the sphere of art (comprehending what we call the arts) because Kuyper’s principle comes into most explicit expression in relation to science. By ‘science’ he means not only the hard or exact sciences, what we sometimes call ‘natural science’, but also what he sometimes calls the ‘spiritual’, what we might term the ‘human’, sciences, comprehending such disciplines as psychology or sociology. Kuyper thought that the kind of knowledge towards which the mind is naturally designed to gravitate is organic, inter-relating the various spheres of knowledge.<sup>6</sup> Christian knowing is thus bound to be distinctive. We see the world as it is, to the extent that we view it as created, fallen, redeemed in Christ and destined for eschatological perfection. We see the world in him through whom it was created and redeemed. To think rigorously with the mind, in correspondence to this orientation of the regenerate heart, is the prerogative, privilege and responsibility of the elect. Our thinking is thus bound to be distinctive; we strive as a matter of fundamental principle to see all things in Christ, in God, in the Father, Son and Spirit.

Can we possibly gainsay these asseverations? Kuyper makes clear that divergent epistemological principles do not entail distinctions in every sphere or at every level of knowledge.<sup>7</sup> And Kuyper must be broadly right here, in affirming, on the one hand, the necessity and the logical distinctiveness of thinking in and in the light of Christ and, on the other, the similarities or identities with non-Christian thought which will emerge in different spheres, processes or levels of intellectual operation. But there is a difficulty in his account. Kuyper is the theologian both of the antithesis and of common grace: the distinction between regenerate and unregenerate secures the antithesis; the affirmation of

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<sup>5</sup> *Encyclopedia*, 152.

<sup>6</sup> This is the application of the fact, established early in the *Encyclopedia*, that ‘[t]here lies a majesty in the human mind by virtue of which it cannot rest until it has acquired full *dominion* in the world of thought’ (15).

<sup>7</sup> *Encyclopedia*, 157-9.

common grace complementarily modifies it.<sup>8</sup> I am not worried here about the optimal way of characterizing the relation of the antithesis to common grace or about whether Kuyper is consistent or not. (In principle, there is no reason why both antithesis and common grace should not be congenial, rather than conflicting, ideas.) My difficulty can be pinpointed more particularly. In his *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: its Principles*, after expounding the significance of regeneration, Kuyper describes the antithesis in terms of the distinction between regeneration and *naturalism*.<sup>9</sup> But where does conservative Jewish or Islamic thought fit into his scheme? The religious Jew or Muslim is neither regenerate nor a naturalist. Kuyper argued for two kinds of science; should we now make it three or four? And having expanded to three or four, can we stop there? And if we can not, does not the notion of ‘antithesis’ call for re-examination and significant reformulation? Does it not, from a psychological, if not a logical, point of view, trade off of a sense of duality? Kuyper was clear that two kinds of *consciousness*, regenerate and non-regenerate, sprang from two kinds of *being*.<sup>10</sup> Being, the ontological, is not a psychological, state. But the psychology of antithesis is the harder to sustain, or, at least, would have to be significantly re-cast, once we expand alternatives from two to at least three, and that has repercussion for the Christian frame of mind in the academy. (The strict logic of antithesis would take longer to explore.)

It remains, possible, of course, that, however many options are out there, distinctiveness is the first mark of the Christian mind, so our swift raid on Kuyper does not accomplish more than offering an *ad hoc*, even a *prima facie*, challenge to one way of conceiving Christian distinctiveness. As far as I am concerned, it might be possible to lay my worries to rest within a Kuyperian framework; I am not interested here in discussion of that point. But at least, while remaining on the relatively abstract level, I hope that we can see how initially conjuring up the contrast or distinction between the notions of ‘faithfulness’ and of ‘distinctiveness’ is potentially fruitful.

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<sup>8</sup> For a good account, see Peter S. Heslam, *Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> *Encyclopedia*, 176.

<sup>10</sup> *Encyclopedia*, 152.

## *Resurrection*

Let me adumbrate a theological framework for Christian thought, one that is actually consistent with Kuyper's theology. At creation, humanity is mandated to have dominion over the earth.<sup>11</sup> Many have recently drawn attention to the resemblance between Eden and the Temple, Eden being a kind of temple-garden or sanctuary.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, God's rest on the seventh day signifies his residence in his cosmic temple.<sup>13</sup> The Fall plunges humanity into soteriological crisis. If we may speak of a cultural mandate in Genesis 1, the question arises of how we are to understand the human task from now on, i.e., to what extent preoccupation with the issue of salvation, conceived as the need to enter personally into the eschatological kingdom of God, should affect or eclipse our responsibility to fulfill our creation remit. That is a question that can only be answered when we contemplate God's remedy, enacted and revealed in the resurrection of the crucified Christ. We shall return near the conclusion to that answer, which impinges on the question of the point of our academic engagement. Assuming that we believe in the point of it, it is the significance of the resurrection that will occupy us.

Regeneration, a concern of both Abraham Kuyper and those who emphasise soteriology in a more narrowly conceived way than he did, is our integration by the Spirit into the life of the new aeon, put into glorious effect by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the incarnate one.<sup>14</sup> Most explicitly of all the authors of the NT, at least on the surface, Paul's theology of the individual's response to God is rooted in his perception of the new age inaugurated with and in Jesus Christ. Time before the coming of Christ bears the stamp of Adam; history is engulfed by sin and death, from which even God's law can not deliver us, although it indicates a deliverer who is to come and instructs the people of God on how to live in the time prior to his coming. When he said that Jesus Christ himself died to sin and that the believer in Christ must reckon himself dead to sin

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<sup>11</sup> Genesis 1:28, whose sense, rather than strict wording, I am expressing here.

<sup>12</sup> For a popular presentation, see the work of my colleague, T.Desmond Alexander, *From Eden to the New Jerusalem: Exploring God's plan for life on earth* (Nottingham. IVP, 2008) chapter 2.

<sup>13</sup> John Walton, *The lost world of Genesis One: ancient cosmology and the origins debate* (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> His *Lectures on Calvinism* well indicate the scope of Kuyper's soteriology.

(Romans 6:10-11), Paul was thinking in aeonic, epochal terms: in his death, Christ exited the sphere of sin's sway and, in his resurrection, he entered a new one, carved out by self-giving sacrifice on the cross.<sup>15</sup>

The resurrection-ascension is the hinge on which the Christian Scriptures turn because it is the hinge on which world history turns. It is not only the translation of the redeeming work of the cross into the present, as Christ, our great high priest, appears in the presence of the Father. It is also eschatology anticipated, which is why justification in the present is an anticipation of God's eschatological verdict and why we await with confident joy a new heaven and earth where the reign begun with Jesus' exaltation to the Father's side will be consummated. Moreover, it looks backwards, to creation's beginnings. For all things were made through Christ, but the bleak course of human history impels us to ask what will become of this basal cosmic fact, now that humans have sinned and things have gone awry in creation? The coming of the Logos into his world to redeem his world is an affirmation of creation, since his coming culminates in a victorious resurrection from the grave. So the Word through whom all things came to be is the Word triumphant; we live in a new aeon, to which the church is meant to bear witness; there is an eschatological consummation which, we have reason to believe, is not the entire abolition of creation, but which, in the form of transforming re-creation that we can only conceive in pictures, will be creation's redemption.

So what, as far as epistemology is concerned? To think in Christ is to think in the light of resurrection reality. Regeneration aligns us with that reality, but the consciousness to which it properly gives rise, which we must cultivate, is not, first and foremost, that of a horizontal antithesis but of alignment with an objective new vertical-horizontal order. So we ought to be asking directly, in the first instance, as a matter of theological principle, about the epistemological fall-out, not of regeneration or distinctiveness, but of the objectivity of the new aeon and the significance of the resurrection. What is the epistemological fall-out?

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<sup>15</sup> Generally, no commentator on Romans has laid greater stress on Paul's two-aeonic thinking than Anders Nygren, *Commentary on Romans* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1944).

To think from a basis in resurrection is to think from an *event*; it is to construct our epistemology from an empirical base, but not necessarily in an ordinary empirical manner, as though starting with sheer sense-perception. The accessibility of the resurrection to the senses and, in that form, to reason, is a matter that raises questions of its own. Although this is not the place to go into it, the resurrection of Jesus Christ as an event which *both* belongs to our space and time *and* involves spatio-temporal coordinates different from our ordinary empirical ones, has as its epistemological correlate *both* the involvement of our senses and, hence, reason, in their ordinary modes *and* the exercise of a spiritual discernment, faith, which transcends and cannot be reduced to empirical judgement.<sup>16</sup>

1. The event' quality of the resurrection has the most immediate, up-front implications for two academic disciplines. The first is **history**. Usually, historians assume, in their study, immanent causes and effects. They may agree that personal agency operates causally in different ways from impersonal processes. They may allow for the theoretical possibility of supernatural agency. But, if so, that is no concern of the historian, qua historian, it will be said. However, the believer who enquires into what constitutes historical knowledge in the light of the resurrection is committed to the belief that accounts of historical processes which are, as a matter of principle, immanent, are reductionist. Supremely, a immanent account of the origins of Christianity will be a partial historical explanation and will not have grasped even the most important part. To the extent that the resurrection demonstrates the power of God as Spirit in history, whether or not in miraculous operation, it renders all history impenetrable in significant ways to the gaze of those who do not take resurrection as the epistemological guide to historical possibility and agency. The historical knowledge of those who do not reckon with resurrection is doomed to superficiality; they will, for example ascribe to relevant religious *belief*, but not to relevant religious *realities*, causal powers in history. I shall later ask the question of whether it is necessary to believe in the resurrection of Christ, as

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<sup>16</sup> For a peerless relatively short account, see T.F.Torrance, *Space, Time and Resurrection* (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1976).

opposed to God ‘in general’, as it were, in order to take the approach to history which I have touched on here.

2. The second discipline for which resurrection has immediate implications, on account of its quality as ‘event’, is **physics**. For all the varieties of philosophy of science, physicists treat phenomena as (loosely speaking) determinate entities with determinate causal powers even if, since the quantum world was opened out, we have discovered that these powers operate wonderfully mysteriously or unexpectedly. The resurrection of Christ from the dead does not entail that entities lack determination or the possession of causal powers, only that these are themselves subject to causal operations and powers of a different and more powerfully determining order. Thus, he or she who believes in resurrection believes that a total explanation of our world in terms of physics or biology is impossible. Further, and more particularly, resurrection brings to light a field or fields of spatio-temporal co-ordinates which intersect and interact with our own but which are irreducible to four-dimensionality. Resurrection reveals a fifth dimension. Thus, the Christian physicist who believes in resurrection knows that space and time are inexplicable without the presupposition that the dead may be raised. Again, the question arises of whether it is necessary to believe in resurrection specifically, as opposed to God in general, in order to take this approach to physics and this question leads us to the next point.

3. Resurrection is not presented to us biblically and theologically as sheer *event*. Its *significance* is what matters and we may select two academic disciplines here too in order to illustrate this, all too blandly and briefly. Take, first, **anthropology**, in its cultural-evolutionary aspects. What becomes of the humanity created by God? Does sin and fall mean that it is abandoned by the Creator to the state of evolutionary flotsam, the civilizations which it builds being precarious, inconsequential, liable to the curse of ultimate meaninglessness? The answer is that resurrection establishes humanity. It reveals humanity as defined by its status as hearer of the Word – humanity has that status *now*; it is not that that it once possessed it but God has now ceased to address us since we plunged the world into sin. According to some theological constructions that connect

resurrection and eschaton, resurrection discloses that all which humans produce in the way of the beautiful, the good and the true is destined for permanence, for eschatological purification and transformation in the kingdom of God. Perhaps so; at all events, resurrection reveals that humanity is unintelligible from the standpoint of immanent evolutionary processes. And so the *significance* of the resurrection brings to light what its quality as *event* does not. Discussing the implications of the resurrection as *event* for history and physics, we asked whether theistic belief in general could be as suitable a starting-point for knowledge as is resurrection in particular. It is when we move, as we have now done, to the *significance* of the resurrection that we see the inadequacy of mere theism. Only the resurrection of Jesus from the dead reveals the true value, nature and destiny of humankind. To know this about humankind in the light of the resurrection is to know the most important thing to be known; it is epistemological principle and armour with a vengeance.

4. I shall give a second and final example in connection with the significance of the resurrection. This is the discipline of moral philosophy or **ethics**. How should we conceive the moral order? Is there one? Resurrection passes judgment on all flesh and assures all flesh of its judgment. The author of Ecclesiastes concludes his work by declaring that moral action gives meaning to humanity. Meaning is not found immanently in the historical process ('everything is meaningless'); it is not discernible personally or cosmically.<sup>17</sup> But, he tells us, moral nihilism should not ensue. On the contrary, 'Fear God and obey His commandments; for that is the whole duty of man. For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every hidden thing, whether it is good or evil' (12:13-14). The resurrection of Jesus, born of a woman into our futile time, publicly and definitively establishes the moral order. It makes of accountability a fundamental moral category. It establishes moral realism; morality is not a construct. It tells us how we may and should live. It places human moral striving under the sign of the forgiveness of sin. It does not leave moral decision-making at the formulaic mercy of mere intellectual identification of moral principle plus rational application to circumstance; it heralds the

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<sup>17</sup> The Hebrew has more the sense of 'vanishing', 'transient' or 'fleeting' than 'meaningless'; everything is like passing mist.

guidance of the Holy Spirit. Resurrection entails ethical insight of the most fundamental kind: humanity is designed for the law of God, mediated by Christ, applied by the Spirit.

And we have only given examples.

### ***Conclusion***

Let us return to our earlier question about the cultural mandate and the question of salvation. What does resurrection tell us about the basis of our involvement in the academy, the interplay of our concern to fulfill the mandate and attend to the salvation of our own and others' souls? Paul referred us back to Abraham: Jew and Gentile alike are heirs to the covenant made with father Abraham, who was justified by faith. But let us remember that Abraham was descended from Noah and Noah was the representative recipient of God's covenant with creation. The vocabulary of Genesis 9 is redolent of the vocabulary of Genesis 1; post-diluvian life is creation re-started. And Paul looked back to Adam (Romans 5), from whom Noah descended and who is actually called by Luke the son of God, from whom Jesus is descended (Luke 3:38). So the salvation of the family of faith is set in the context of the design to rescue creation. To put summarily what should be argued at greater length: resurrection accomplishes this rescue of creation.<sup>18</sup> In practice, the issue of personal salvation is pressing as are the needs of the poor and suffering. We dare not marginalize their importance. But resurrection in some sort renews our dominion mandate and academic endeavour must be seen in that light. It is a part of the discipleship to which we are called.

This fact opens out other academic spheres. The Hebrew Bible or Old Testament contains literature whose aesthetic quality is appreciable even when its content is dire; the evocation of literary delight appears to be an aspect of the exercise of human dominion. The resurrection of Jesus Christ does not have the same direct impact on the field of literature (or on aesthetics more broadly) as it does qua event on history and physics and,

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<sup>18</sup>See Oliver O'Donovan, *Resurrection and Moral Order: an outline for evangelical ethics* (Leicester: Apollos, 1994).

in terms of its significance, on such areas as anthropology and ethics. But, in establishing creation, it warrants our cultivation of its various spheres. By Jesus Christ 'all things were created, things visible and things invisible', Paul tells the Colossians (1:18), proceeding to say that we who believe in him have 'put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator' (3:10). The new self is the foe of autonomy, whether it dons rationalist or postmodernist dress. Its aspiration is to take every thought captive to the risen Christ.

There is a range of edifying ways in which Christians can approach knowing, in an academic context, which we can not explore now. These may not be distinctively Christian. Six examples may be given, somewhat at random. Firstly, we can emphasise slow and patient acquisition of knowledge.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, we can emphasise the tradition of intellectual virtues in connection with knowledge.<sup>20</sup> Thirdly, Michael Polanyi's notion of significant knowledge as tacit, rather than formalized, deserves our attention.<sup>21</sup> Fourthly, we should attend to Nietzsche's formulation: '...The moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. To explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well...to ask...what morality does this...aim at?'<sup>22</sup> Fifthly, theologically connected with this, we might explore the structure of knowing encapsulated in Eve's fatal temptation: desire skews perception and creates illusion; the mistaken intellect directs the will to action; unreason rules the 'knowing' process.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The whole passage in Baron Friedrich von Hügel's essay 'On the Preliminaries to Religious Belief and on the Facts of Suffering, Faith and Love' in volume 1 of his *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (London/Toronto: Dent, 1921), from which the following words are taken, should be consulted: 'We get to know [certain] realities slowly, laboriously, intermittently, partially...not altogether apart from our dispositions...in proportion as we become less self-occupied, less self-centred...' (104).

<sup>20</sup> See W.Jay Wood's fine introduction to *Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous* (Leicester: Apollos, 1998). This is closely connected with the first point above, but draws more specifically on formal post-Aristotelian traditions.

<sup>21</sup> Polanyi's essays in *Knowing and Being* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) well supplement or refine the contentions of his major work.

<sup>22</sup> F.Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, tr. R.J.Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990) I.6.

<sup>23</sup> Here, I am abstractly analysing Genesis 3:6 against its background.

Finally, there is Pascal. As he saw it, like it or not, while you live with any degree of control over your life, you have actually placed a bet on life; you have wagered. You are alive and, assuming that you have the power to do so, you have decided to act or not to act, how to live or not to live. You have no choice but to decide. While you suspend pretensions to knowledge and argue about beliefs until the cows come home, you are practically committed one way or another. ‘Knowing’ takes place in the context of deciding. On what basis did you decide? Interpreted aright, Pascal’s ‘wager’ exposes the irrational vagaries of our ‘knowing’.<sup>24</sup> He teaches us to know our knowing for what it is, something all too often built on sand. His averment that ‘Jesus Christ is a God whom we can approach without pride and before whom we can humble ourselves without despair’ rings true because, in his resurrection, Christ teaches us to know our being for what it is.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Pascal’s ‘Wager’ is printed in *Pensées*, tr. A.J.Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1966) 149-153.

<sup>25</sup> *Pensées* I.section 212.